Is money supply targeting obsolete? by Langfeldt, Enno et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Langfeldt, Enno; Scheide, Joachim; Trapp, Peter
Working Paper
Is money supply targeting obsolete?
Kiel Working Papers, No. 338
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Langfeldt, Enno; Scheide, Joachim; Trapp, Peter (1988) : Is money supply
targeting obsolete?, Kiel Working Papers, No. 338, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/492Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Working Paper No. 338
Is Money Supply Targeting Obsolete?
by
Enno 'Langfeldt, Joachim Scheide
\S and Peter Trapp
Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
D-2300 Kiel, Diisternbrooker Weg 120
Working Paper No. 338
Is Money Supply Targeting Obsolete?
by
Enno iLangfeldt, Joachim Scheide
and Peter Trapp
October 1988
The authors themselves, not the Kiel Institute of World Econo-
mics, are solely responsible for the contents and distribution of
each Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticisms and sugges-
tions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with
them. ISSN 0342-0787IS MONEY SUPPLY TARGETING OBSOLETE?
Contents
Page
I. What Can Be Expected from Monetary Policy? 2
II. The Experience with Money Supply Targeting 4
III. How Good Are Alternative Targets for Monetary Policy?.. 8
IV. The Case for Money Supply Rules 15
V. Toward a Constitutional Rule for Monetary Policy 21
Bibliography 26
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1 - Money and Price Level in Industrial Countries
Table 2 - Real Interest Rates in Industrial Countries
Figure 1 - Money and Inflation in the Industrial Countries
Figure 2 - Raw Material Prices and Inflation in the Industrial
Countries
Figure 3 - Raw Material Prices and Money Supply in
Industrial Countries
Figure 4 - Velocity and Interest Rates in Industrial
Countries
Figure 5 - Money and Domestic Demand in Industrial
CountriesAbstract
Money supply targeting has come out of fashion. The large changes
in velocity in some countries and the fact that inflation is
still low in spite of the strong monetary expansion in most in-
dustrial economies since 1985 have undermined the formerly accep-
ted notion of a stable relationship between money and economic
activity. In this paper, the most important objections to money
supply targeting are discussed. Furthermore, alternative indica-
tors for monetary policy, e.g., interest rates and raw material
prices, are analyzed; they seem to have serious weaknesses. A
closer look at the relationship between money and economic acti-
vity reveals that in most countries the volatility of velocity is
no more pronounced than in earlier years. Only in a few countries
the relationship is disturbed. However, this is largely due to
changes in the financial system which were partly caused by high
and volatile inflation rates. Therefore, we argue that a case for
monetary rules can still be made. Some rules which have been
proposed in the literature are designed to adjust to trend chan-
ges in velocity. Simulations suggest that if central banks had
followed such rules, economic performance would have improved
substantially. We conclude that it would be desirable to imple-
ment a rule-based policy in industrial countries and suggest that
rules should be enforced by law.IS MONEY SUPPLY TARGETING OBSOLETE?
"To sum up, the most
important thing about




In recent.years, the discussion about the role of monetary policy
for stabilizing the economy has intensified again. On the one end
of the spectrum, many economists and politicians have argued that
the strategy of money supply targeting has either altogether
failed or is no longer appropriate because of substantial and
unpredictable shifts in velocity. The contention is that the link
between the growth rate of the money supply and inflation has
disappeared; therefore, central banks should try to control
other, more important variables such as unemployment. The alter-
native view is that the relationship between money and economic
activity in principle still holds, but that in some countries the
link has been disturbed because of changes in the financial sec-
tor. It has been shown that monetary policy can adjust to such
changes and still pursue a rule-like policy. At present, the
views on what monetary policy should do differ substantially;
basically, the discussion can be viewed as a new round in the
rules-versus-discretion debate. This discussion has some bearing
for the question how monetary authorities should respond to the
strong increase capacity utilization and the emergence of infla-
tionary expectations in 1988.
In this paper, we will discuss the basic issue of the role of
monetary policy, the experience with money supply targeting, and
the possible alternative indicators for monetary policy. We will
conclude that a case for monetary targeting can still be made and
refer to concrete examples of rules. Finally, we will shortly
discuss how such rules for monetary policy can be enforced.- 2 -
I. What Can Be Expected from Monetary Policy?
In all industrial countries, governments have the monopoly of
producing money. The central task of the monetary authority is to
keep the cost of holding money as low as possible and to contri-
bute to a stable economic environment. Experience shows that this
can best be achieved if the purchasing power of money is stable
(1). Major movements in the price level lead to serious misalign-
ments in the economy. Unanticipated inflation shifts wealth from
creditors to debtors; high inflation induces economic agents to
hold less money than otherwise, and to buy real assets just for
the sake of avoiding a wealth loss. How severe these distortions
can become is best demonstrated by countries with very high in-
flation rates, e.g. Argentina [Fischer, Hiemenz, Trapp 1985], But
in an environment of moderate inflation, too, like in most OECD-
countries, resources are absorbed by efforts to avoid losses from
inflation. As a result, real income is lower in the medium run
than it could be under price level stability.
Since the demand for real balances depends on the volume of
transactions in the economy - which can roughly be approximated
by measures such as real GNP -, the recommendation to keep mone-
tary expansion close to the development of the production poten-
tial can be seen as a promising way to assure price level stabi-
lity in the medium run. A more rapid monetary expansion would
only increase the price level. This theoretical underpinning is
largely confirmed by observations over long periods [Barro, 1987,
p. 463] and also for more recent years (Table 1) . Persistently
high rates of inflation even have an adverse effect on employ-
ment, i.e., in the longer run, there is a positive relationship
between inflation and unemployment [Friedman, 1977].
(1) This conclusion, admittedly, deviates from Friedman's [1969]
proposal that a constant rate of deflation is necessary to
achieve the optimum quantity of money.- 3 -
Table 1 - Money and Price Level in Industrial Countries
Money per unit GNP-deflator
of output (a)
Average percentage increase per year
Japan 19 73-86 . 3.3 4.8
West Germany 1973-86 5.4 4.0
United States 1973-86 5.7 6.7
France 1977-85 7.4 9.7
United Kingdom 1975-86 12.1 10.1
Italy 1973-86 12.6 16.6
(a) Ml/GNP at constant prices.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Washington,
D.C., various issues. - Own calculations.
This long-run relationship may not hold in the short run. Indeed,
in the past we could observe that recessions were overcome with
the help of expansionary monetary policies and that restrictive
measures have usually produced a recession. However, there is no
sustained effect of money on the level of economic activity. An
acceleration of monetary expansion can only produce a temporary
reduction of the real interest rate because in the course of
time, higher demand for goods tends to increase the interest
rate. Since people start to expect higher inflation, nominal
interest rates go up further; and when inflation actually picks
up the expansion of the real money supply slows down and thus the
impulse for economic activity becomes smaller. Since central
banks usually pursue restrictive policies in the face of increa-
sing inflation, the downturn of the economy is aggravated.
There are other important obstacles to fine-tuning in the short
run. The main problem is that we do not know enough about the
lags of monetary policy. As a result, an anticyclical measure may
in fact have a destabilizing impact. Furthermore, our knowledge
about such variables as the natural rate of unemployment or about
the behavior of economic agents is very limited. Under these
conditions it is impossible to finetune the economy. This could
well be observed in the late seventies, when unemployment in most- 4 -
European countries was substantially higher than in the early
seventies. Then, many believed that there was ample scope to ex-
pand demand without running the risk of rekindling inflation.
However, very quickly after the expansionary measures had been
taken, inflation accelerated and progress in reducing unemploy-
ment was disappointingly small. The reason behind this was that
conditions on labor markets had deteriorated substantially (1) .
In the late eighties, the situation is similar: unemployment is
again much higher than in the previous cycle. But also this time,
there is no evidence that this high level was caused by a persis-
tent lack of demand. On the contrary, over the last six years
output expanded noticeably and the capacity utilization in most
countries is close to or even above previous peak levels.
II. The Experience with Money Supply Targeting
In the early seventies, the idea that growth and employment can-
not be stimulated permanently by monetary policy was behind the
decision of many central banks to change their strategy. Accele-
rating inflation had cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of
the traditional measures of inflation control. After having gai-
ned independence in monetary policy by the introduction of flex-
ible exchange rates, monetary authorities intended to direct
their policy at achieving price level stability in the medium
run. They announced to give up targeting interest rates and to
pursue a policy of directly controlling monetary aggregates in
such a way as to assure a steady expansion. Central banks were
largely convinced by empirical evidence which showed that there
was a close relationship between the development of money and
that of nominal income or of the price level. The announcement of
a monetary target was also seen as a way to enhance the credibi-
lity of the monetary authorities in the public.
(1) See the analysis of Phillips-curves in various industrial
countries in Schatz, Scheide, Trapp [1988]. On the labor
market conditions and the factors contributing to high unem-
ployment, see Emerson [1987] and, on a case study for West
Germany, see Sdltwedel, Trapp [1988].- 5 -
Actual policies, however, differed not only between countries but
also within a country in the course of time, and departed strong-
ly from the stated objectives. While some central banks announced
targets for only one aggregate (West Germany, France, Canada),
other countries had several target variables (US, UK). Later on,
most countries moved toward announcing a target band instead of a
single target number. By this the monetary authorities retained a
substantial amount of discretion; for example, a change of mone-
tary expansion from the lower to the upper margin of the target
band implied a noticeable shift in the stance of policy. But
apart from this, the central banks even missed their targets in
about half of all cases; most of the time targets were overshot
(1). The credibility of central banks was more and more undermi-
ned. It was also weakened because the authorities changed the
target range within the year (US), shifted to another aggregate
and even gave up some indicators (US, UK) , or, in an extreme
case, stopped money supply targeting altogether (Canada). Since
the middle of the eighties, more and more central banks seem to
be willing to give up money supply targeting or to use different
indicators.
The reasons for missing monetary targets can be seen in the poor
control mechanism - most central banks continued to manipulate
interest rates - and in the fact that money stock targets colli-
ded with other objectives of monetary policy. The attempt of
international coordination of policies played an important role.
In the late seventies, the locomotive-strategy of coordinated
expansion was applied; more recently, the Plaza-agreement (Sep-
tember 1985) and the Louvre-accord (February 1987) included tar-
gets for exchange rates. All these arrangements led to a substan-
tial overshooting of monetary targets, in particular, in Japan
and West Germany. But not only these attempts to stabilize ex-
change rates at certain levels and to bring about a reduction of
external balances were responsible for deviations from the tar-
get. Very often domestic considerations were also important.
(1) For an overview, see Chouraqui, Driscoll, Strauss-Kahn
[1988, p. 45].- 6 -
Targets were overshot in times of weak growth and high unemploy-
ment. Debt problems, too, which were viewed as a threat to the
stability of the banking sector were used as an excuse for mis-
sing the target (US), in another case the monetary authorities
felt forced to allow a higher expansion of the money supply be-
cause of the large debt of the public sector (Italy). Tight poli-
cies were pursued - and sometimes led to an undershooting - to
fight inflation and to import stability via exchange rate appre-
ciation, or because the central bank was concerned about a defi-
cit in the current account (West Germany).
Taken together, these facts suggest that there has hardly ever
been a steady monetary policy in any major country in spite of
the announcements. In recent years, more and more central banks
also seem to dispense with the philosophy of steady money growth
altogether. The main argument is that - in their opinion - the
relationships between money and various measures of economic
activity which held up so well in the seventies do not seem to be
valid anymore. In particular, many economists and central bankers
point at the fact that there has been no pickup of inflation in
spite of the high - and sometimes even accelerating - monetary
expansion since 1985 (Figure 1). Some tentative explanations are
offered to account for this break. It could be that the marked
reduction of inflation and of interest rates since the early
eighties led to a sharp increase of the demand for money. People
preferred to hold cash rather than to expand spending since they
expected a further decline in prices, in particular, in the wake
of the collapse of oil prices in 1985 and thereafter. However,
this behavior can soon be reversed when price expectations turn
around and - as is likely in 1988/89 - lead to higher inflation
and interest rates. Another explanation concerns the change in
the definition of money due to financial innovations. In a few
countries, in particular the US and the UK, the share of inter-
est-bearing assets in Ml has increased substantially. Thus, this
aggregate has lost much of its quality as an indicator for the
propensity to spend and is, therefore, no longer as closely corre-
lated with the price level as in the past. However, in other- 7 -
Figure 1 - Money and Inflation in the Industrial Countries
(p.c. change over previous year)
Money supply M 1
(Upper time scale) —
Consumer prices
(Lower time scale)
1960 65 70 75 85
1962 65 70 75 80 85 89 (a)
(a) 1988 and 1989 estimated.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Economic
Outlook, April 1988.- 8 -
countries, e.g., West Germany (1) financial innovations and dere-
gulation have hardly played any role.
III. How Good Are Alternative Targets for Monetary Policy?
Since the relationship especially between money and prices seems
to have become loose, there are several proposals to use other
indicators as a guideline of monetary policy.
The first alternative are interest rates. Many observers point at
the high level of real interest rates in industrial countries and
argue that monetary policy is excessively tight and prevents
faster growth. Although we cannot observe real interest rates,
all approximations confirm the diagnosis, of relatively high ra-
tes. During the upswing in the seventies, they were extremely
low, in some cases even negative (Table 2). But did high real
rates of interest prevent or dampen the recovery in the eighties?
Developments in the United States do not confirm this view.
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Washington,
D.C., various issues. - Own calculations.
In fact, the increase of real interest rates in the US was as
pronounced as elsewhere, but nevertheless real GNP and employment
(1) See Dudler [1986] .- 9 -
expanded as fast as in the previous cycle when interest rates
were extremely low. Similarly the UK: after 1982, this country
experienced the sharpest increase in real rates, but the recovery
was stronger than in the seventies and also stronger than in most
other European economies. And finally, West Germany had the smal-
lest increase of real interest rates; nevertheless, the economic
performance during the present cycle was weaker than in the past.
These observations suggest that the increase in real interest
rates was not the main cause for the differences in growth rates
of real GNP (1) and that high real interest rates do not necessa-
rily indicate tight monetary policies.
Long-term changes in real interest rates rather reflect a real
phenomenon of an adjustment process going on in an economy; high
interest rates indicate a shortage of savings. As a consequence,
only investment projects with a relatively high rate of profit
can be carried out. This basic constellation cannot be changed by
printing money. But what about short-run effects? If the central
banks can create an unexpected increase in the money supply, real
interest rates will go down. But it must be doubted that monetary
policy can produce such surprises over longer periods of time.
Market participants learn to anticipate future actions of the
central bank. If they expect more expansionary policies, interest
rates will go up. If the central bank uses this as an indication
of a shortage of liquidity, it will increase the money supply and
thus validate the expectations and contribute to more inflation.
The main problem is that of interpretation. Since real interest
rates cannot be observed, nominal rates cannot easily be quali-
fied as being "too high" or "too low". Another problem of inter-
pretation concerns the effects of real disturbances. If a tempo-
rary negative shock hits the economy, real interest rates must
rise since the supply of goods goes down relative to the demand.
If the central bank interprets the rise as signalling a tight
(1) For a discussion of this issue, see also Schatz, Scheide,
Trapp [1988].- 10 -
policy, it will expand the money supply. But this will only re-
sult in a further increase of the price level, so this action
would be counterproductive since it leads to a violation of one
target (price level stability) without benefitting other targets
(e.g., employment).
A second proposal, very much propagated by governments of large
industrial countries [e.g., Baker, 1987, and Lawson, 1987], is to
use raw material prices as a guide for monetary policy. These
prices seem to be a leading indicator for general inflation and
can thus be used to judge the course of monetary policy. The
empirical evidence, however, is not unambiguous (Figure 2). While
the strong increase of raw material prices in 1972/73 and 1978/80
was indeed followed by an acceleration of inflation, this effect
did not materialize in 1976/77 and 1983/84. Thus, the link seems
to be unreliable (1) . This is not surprising since raw material
prices strongly respond to supply shocks, such as harvest failu-
res or supply cutbacks created by cartels.
The functioning of raw material prices as an indicator is impair-
ed by another problem. Monetary policy would react only after the
inflationary dangers have already become apparent. Given the long
lag in the effect of monetary policy on inflation, it would pro-
bably be too late to prevent prices from rising. All the central
bank may be able to achieve is to dampen the acceleration. In
order to avoid inflation altogether it is necessary to eliminate
the main cause for the increase in raw material prices as well as
for the general price level, and in the past, this common cause
has been the strong increase of demand mainly resulting from a
strong monetary expansion.
The average lag between the development of the money stock and
raw material prices is about one year. Compared to the lag be-
tween money and general inflation this is quite a short period
(Figure 3). The quick response of raw material prices to monetary
(1) This is supported by the time-series analysis (causality
tests) in Durand, Blc-ndal [1988].- 11 -
Figure 2 - Raw Material Prices and Inflation in the Industrial
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(c)Raw material price index of the Kiel Institute ol World Economics, in SDR ierms.
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators; - Own calculations.
Figure 3 - Raw Material Prices and Money Supply in the Industrial
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(a) Raw material price index of the Kiel Institute of World Economics, in
SDR terms. - (b) Partly estimated. .
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Economic
Outlook, April 1988.- Own calculations.- 12 -
impulses is due to well-functioning future markets and to the
high interest elasticity of raw material inventories. In the
course of 1988, raw material prices surged again; this is con-
sistent with the previous strong acceleration of monetary expan-
sion. In view of the relatively close link between money and raw
material prices, the best way to avoid excessive price fluctua-
tions is to keep the expansion of the money supply stable. Of
course, this would not eliminate all price variations because
some changes are caused by real phenomena as was also the case
with interest rates. Since it is impossible to distinguish be-
tween price changes caused by real shocks and by monetary shocks
the development of raw material prices is not a reliable policy
guide. Therefore, central banks should refrain from short-run
manipulation of the money supply but rather provide a stable
monetary environment.
Some proposals stress that exchange rate changes can signal
whether monetary policy is too tight (real appreciation) or too
loose (real depreciation). An example is the McKinnon-Plan (1)
which consists of two main elements: Firstly, the aggregate money
supply of major industrial countries should expand according to a
rule designed to achieve overall price level stability. Secondly,
bilateral interventions should keep exchange rates at the level
of purchasing power parity (PPP); this is seen as a fundamental
precondition for avoiding major inflationary or deflationary
impacts from abroad caused by "unnecessarily volatile" changes in
expectations of international investors which serve no economic
purpose [McKinnon, 1988, p. 86],
The critical issues are first, how can the equilibrium exchange
rates be calculated to make this plan work, and second, is ex-
change rate stability really necessary to assure price level
stability? The reference exchange rate cannot be calculated by
simply comparing the price of a certain basket of goods in two
(1) This proposal was first made in 1974, after the collapse of
the Bretton-Woods system. A more recent and slightly changed
version is McKinnon [1988].Bibl.othek
des fnstituts fur Weltwf rtschafo
- 13 -
countries: "...What an extraordinary resurgence of a doctrine
long thought dead and buried ..." [Dornbusch, 1988, p. 109]. The
reason for the invalidity of absolute PPP is that the baskets
contain goods that are not perfect substitutes. Thus, it is im-
possible to determine the absolute value of the "correct" PPP-
exchange rate. In addition, there have been substantial and long
lasting deviations from relative PPP over the last 15 years. What
is behind these movements, and can the McKinnon-Plan prevent them
from occurring?
A large part of exchange rate volatility has certainly resulted
from sudden changes in monetary policy (1) ; this element is in-
deed eliminated by McKinnon's money supply rule, but by itself it
does not constitute a unique policy proposal. However, the major
disagreement with the plan arises because PPP is no acceptable
guiedeline for exchange rate policy; real exchange rates must be
able to adjust whenever there are substantial real divergencies
between countries. Examples are different trends of economic
growth and of technological progress. Therefore, we can expect -
possibly even large - exchange rate changes when there are sub-
stantial shifts in tax policies or in regulatory measures. Fur-
thermore, all kinds of risks are reflected in exchange rate move-
ments. If such changes are prevented by interventions in exchange
markets, other prices will have to adjust. However, the problem
is that these prices are normally not as flexible as is necessary
to prevent lower growth and unemployment. This is most obvious in
the case of wages. Furthermore, real exchange rates will also
have to give if there is a real shock affecting countries differ-
ently. For example, the oil price increases of the seventies
necessitated a relatively strong real depreciation of countries
highly dependent on oil imports to bring about the real income
transfer to oil exporters. Finally, experience shows that ex-
change rate stability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for price level stability. For example, the member
(1) On the effects of changes in the monetary regime on the
dollar-DM exchange rate, see Scheide [1987].- 14 -
countries of the EMS, a system with fixed rates, were not as
successful in reducing inflation as other OECD-countries which
had flexible exchange rates (1).
More recently, the countries participating in economic summit
meetings have suggested to monitor various economic indicators to
judge economic policy. These indicators (2) are also commonly
used in economic analysis; the new element is that this concept
sets out to find a better basis for international policy coordi-
nation by judging the compatibility and sustainability of policy
measures in various countries. As yet, no concrete concept has
been published but it seems that the intention is to define refe-
rence paths for economic targets in terms of various indicators
in order to establish a trigger mechanism for monetary and fiscal
policy when departures from the reference paths are observed.
However, what model can possibly calculate the "correct" level of
the unemployment rate, of the interest rate or - on an internati-
onal scale - of the exchange rate or the "correct" distribution
of current account balances?
It is not only crucial that all countries would have to agree on
the model's results; most likely they won't! (3) It is also high-
ly problematic to connect government policies rigidly to the
results of the market process. As governments have no perfect
knowledge the result would most probably be that adjustment pro-
cesses are delayed and that, for example, the natural rate of
unemployment increases. The indicator concept is much more ambi-
tious than the other proposals discussed above since several
variables are to be made compatible. How should the central banks
act if there are changing priorities and sometimes even conflic-
(1) See the analysis of the inflation performance in Scheide,
Sinn [1987].
(2) The list contains GNP, domestic demand, inflation, unemploy-
ment, balances of trade and current account, monetary expan-
sion, budget deficits, exchange rates, interest rates and
foreign reserves. See Crockett [1987, p. 10].
(3) The differences concerning the policy objectives as well as
the economic theory and philosophy are a major obstacle to
international coordination. See Scheide, Sinn [1987].- 15 -
ting targets? It seems very likely that this fine-tuning on an
international scale will not diminish uncertainty concerning
policies. Agents will have to continue to speculate about future
actions, especially if - what is most likely as long as no com-
prehensive model is available - indicator changes cannot be in-
terpreted in a clear-cut way.
IV. The Case for Money Supply Rules
In view of the weaknesses of the alternatives discussed above it
seems that the link between money and economic activity is still
reliable enough to continue targeting monetary aggregates. As far
as the positive association between velocity of money and
(short-term) interest rates is concerned, the postulated rela-
tionship holds up quite well in several countries (Figure 4).
Interest rates declined, and this led - as to be expected - to
an increase in the demand for money so that the growth rate of
velocity declined. This observation is compatible with the notion
of a stable demand for money function. Exceptions are the US and
the UK, where the fall in velocity was much steeper than can be
explained by the behavior of interest rates. However, the charac-
ter of Ml in both countries has changed in recent years because
it now includes a much larger share of interest-bearing assets.
If this statistical effect is excluded, the relationship between
the adjusted Ml and the interest rate seems to hold very well in
the case of the UK (1).
Furthermore, the link between money and domestic demand is still
quite close, the cyclical turning points can well be explained by
changes in monetary policy: the restriction of 1979/80 was follo-
wed by the recession in 1980/82, and the acceleration in money
growth starting in 1982 contributed to the upswing since 1983.
Only very recently, this link seems to have become loose for the
(1) These adjustments cannot be made for the US because the
necessary data are not available.- 16 -
Figure 4 - Velocity and Interest Rates in Industrial Countries



































1975 1980 1985 1987
(a) Velocity calculated lor the ad lusted money supply Ml including only non-Interest bearing sight deposits. 1980 < 100.
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators; Central Statistical
Office, Financial Statistics, London; own calculations.- 17 -
US - domestic demand did not pick up as strongly as could be
expected from monetary policy; however, this is probably due to
the change of the definition of Ml. For the UK, it can be shown
that the adjusted Ml-aggregate is quite a good indicator. There-
fore, it cannot be concluded that the relationships which were so
reliable in the past have now disappeared. Concerning the lag in
the effect of monetary policy, Friedman's [1961] statement is
still valid that the time span between the change in monetary
policy and that in economic activity is rather long and variable.
Proponents of stable monetary policy have studied the quality of
specific rules. The main advantage of such a policy is that no
longer resources have to be devoted to guessing future actions of
central banks. This would eliminate a great deal of the price
variations on financial markets about which many observers com-
plain so much. Then, central banks would stop to react to monthly
data such as industrial production, trade balances etc. Instead,
the central banks would concentrate on keeping the money supply
on the path they have committed themselves to. What will be pro-
vided by the central bank under these conditions is a public
good: price level stability. Such a predictable policy would, as
empirical evidence shows, contribute to a stable development of
overall demand (1) , a result which has not been achieved by the
discretionary policies actually pursued in industrial countries
(2).
An important element in a policy rule is that the central bank
uses a monetary aggregate that it can control with sufficient
precision. Broader aggregates (Ml, M2 or M3) can be influenced
through changes in the monetary base, but the link seems to be-
ll) Of course, the demand expansion cannot be completely stable
because there are still real disturbances (changes in fiscal
policy, in raw material prices and so on). It is important,
however, that monetary policy does not produce additional
shocks.
(2) For a theoretical analysis showing the superiority of rule-
like policies (in the sense of producing smaller deviations
from targets), see Kydland, Prescott [1977].- 18 -
Figure 5 - Money and Domestic Demand in Industrial Countries
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Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, June 1988; Central Statistical
Office, Financial Statistics, London; own calculations,- 19 -
come the weaker the broader the measure is. So it appears best to
use the monetary base which reflects precisely the actions of, the
central bank (1) . The monetary authorities in industrial coun-
tries should therefore move away from looking at broader aggre-
gates when judging the stance of monetary policy.
Different monetary rules are conceivable; we will discuss the
properties of three variants (2). The first rule is one where the
rate of monetary expansion is fixed in advance; this fixed rule
(or k-percent rule) was proposed by Milton Friedman. The second
rule - by Allan Meltzer [1987] - is less rigid as the the rate of
monetary expansion is adjusted when there are changes in the
trend of velocity and/or the trend of real GNP (approximated by
the realizations in the past three years). The third variant,
which was proposed by Bennett McCallum [1987], incorporates a
feedback mechanism; i.e., the desired rate of change in the mone-
tary base is adjusted when nominal GNP deviates from the target
path. All these rules have in common that - even if they provide
for pre-defined flexibility - they imply a firm commitment by the
central bank and leave no room for discretionary action or cheat-
ing. Thus there is no uncertainty about future intentions of the
central bank. Furthermore, the rules are defined in terms of the
instrument (instrument-based rules) and thus can easily be moni-
tored by the public.
In this respect, these rules are quite different from the often
propagated "GNP-rule" (or "GDP-rule"). Although the latter seems
to be quite similar to the McCallum proposal - which also refers
to nominal GNP -, it does not aim at expanding a monetary aggre-
(1) Some may nevertheless prefer an aggregate like Ml since it
is a better indicator in times of a liquidity crisis. How-
ever, this argument seems to be relevant only for the case
of the Great Depression when the monetary base did not chan-
ge but Ml fell drastically.
(2) There are many criteria to qualify or discriminate between
rules. See, for example, Blinder [1987] and Salin [1988]. -
In what follows we do not refer to rules which imply res-
ponses to changes in real variables, such as the unemploy-
ment rate.- 20 -
gate at certain rate consistent with long-term GNP growth but is
directed at achieving a certain GNP increase as an outcome (out-
come-based rule). The difference is important because there is no
fixed operational mechanism that links changes in GNP to changes
in, e.g., the monetary base. Advocates of this rule claim that
there is no reliable relationship between money and nominal in-
come (1). Therefore, it can not be pre-determined by how much the
money supply has to change, to produce a certain increase in
nominal GNP. If actual GNP is below the target path the central
bank has to increase the growth of the money stock and vice ver-
sa. But the GNP-rule does not define by how much monetary expan-
sion has to accelerate or to decelerate. Apart from this, a prob-
lem arises for this rule because we do not have enough knowledge
about the lagged effects of monetary policy. Therefore, it may be
that monetary policy is changed stronger or more often than ne-
cessary, leading to further fluctuations of economic activity.
Which of the three rules described above should be applied de-
pends on the question how the quantity theory can be translated
into a strategy for monetary policy. If the central bank follows
a policy oriented at the production potential of the economy, it
must estimate the trend change of output and velocity. Estimates
about potential output are available for all major countries, so
the choice for a rule depends more or less on the trend behavior
of velocity. If there are such changes as in the US in recent
years, it would be appropriate to increase (reduce) the desired
rate of monetary expansion if the trend of velocity declines
(increases) . McCallum has tested the properties of such a rule
and found that it would have reduced cyclical fluctuations in the
US substantially. Furthermore, such a rule would have implied a
stable price level on average during the simulation period
1954-1985 (2). In simulations of his feedback rule McCallum con-
(1) See, for example, von Weizsacker [1988].
(2) There would have still been price level changes due to
supply shocks but these would have averaged out over time.
During this period, the price level actually increased by
some 320 percent, which is equivalent to an annual inflation
rate of almost 5 percent.- 21 -
eludes that fluctuations in economic activity would have been
reduced even more than in the Meltzer rule (1).
The rules with a limited degree of flexibility are designed for
the situation in the US. Such flexibility may not be necessary in
a country where the velocity does not show abrupt changes. In a
case study for West Germany it is demonstrated that a strict
application of the k-percent rule would have dampened cyclical
fluctuations of domestic demand substantially [Scheide, 1988].
This means that this rule would have reduced the deviations from
the targets of economic policy (2).
V. Toward a Constitutional Rule for Monetary Policy
Opponents of monetary rules usually argue that a strict policy
might do more harm than good (3) because the flexibility of the
private sector is only limited. However, it may also be true that
the rigidities of wages and prices are so great because agents
can rely on government intervention. Actual discretionary poli-
cies did try to accommodate these rigidities, but as experience
shows they were not successful. All industrial countries have
experienced a more or less substantial decline in the purchasing
power of money and one can hardly argue that real income and
employment would be higher today if only prices had increased
faster. The rules discussed above and the underlying models imply
(1) Some would criticize the close feedback from quarter-to-
quarter changes in nominal GNP because they may also be due
to real shocks, and there is a dispute among economists
whether monetary policy should react in such cases. For a
criticism, see for example Barro [1985, pp. 34 ff.].
(2) Although inflation has always been relatively low in West
Germany, the price level nevertheless doubled between 1972
and 1987.
(3) See Blinder [1987] who argues that the servo-mechanism of
the economy does not work well. For him, a rule could amount
to "fixing a rudder in a stormy sea".- 22 -
that growth and employment cannot be stimulated by inflation and
that, therefore, central banks should not try to control real
variables in the short or medium run. Instead, by pursuing a
stability-oriented policy, they can contribute to a stable expan-
sion of demand and thus prevent major recessions or booms. This
is what also proponents of discretionary policies want to
achieve.
Although many central bankers might, in principle, accept these
considerations, rules have so far not been applied. It seems to
be a major characteristic of the political process that policyma-
kers have a tendency toward activism and would refuse to have
their hands tied by a rule (1) . Central banks, too, have always
argued that flexibility was necessary in order to react to unex-
pected circumstances (2). The common justification for activism
is that policy has to prevent or to counteract unsatisfactory
situations. Often, however, the policy does not provide a remedy
for economic problems but is only postponing the adjustment and
thereby, possibly, even making the outcome worse. For example, in
the seventies, many central banks tried to alleviate the impact
of the oil-price hike by expanding the money supply. This stimu-
lated economic activity somewhat, but only for a short period.
After all, the economies ended up with more inflation than would
otherwise have occurred, and unemployment went up because real
wages did not decline, as should have been the case after the
oil-price hike. The actual increase of unemployment was probably
even higher because the government interventions prevented an
adjustment of real wages. Another example is the policy to reduce
the real value of government debt in those countries where the
central banks are not independent of government influence. The
long-run consequences of all these policies are negative; but
under the time-horizon of policymakers, which is usually the
(1) For a description of the reasons why a discretionary mone-
tary system tends to be inflationary compare Bernholz
[1987].
(2) As an example, see the list of contingencies mentioned by
the Chairman of the US-Fed, Alan Greenspan [1988],- 23 -
short run, it is rational to try to produce short-run benefits
(1).
The reason to think about constitutional rules for monetary poli-
cy is that the existing system is not one of free banking (2) .
The following discussion therefore focuses on the optimal strate-
gy in the second best monetary system. Government monopoly in
controlling money creation puts a large amount of political and
economic power into the hands of central bankers. The private
sector is not allowed to produce competing monies and to vote for
the currency which serves their needs best as a medium of exchan-
ge and as a store of value. Furthermore, regulations and controls
prevent the use of foreign currencies; thus there is no check on
experiments with inflation.
A free society should be interested in limiting the power of a
central bank. It is necessary to create a monetary constitution
which eliminates the discretionary power and enforces a money
supply policy for a stable environment. One pre-condition for
such a regime is that the central bank is independent of govern-
ment control, like the Fed in the US or the Bundesbank in West
Germany. Experience shows, however, that independence alone is
not a guarantee for a stable policy. And independence cannot
mean: free of control. The importance of monetary policy makes it
necessary to enforce a law according to which the central bank
has to follow a binding rule.
(1) This behavior is formalized in Kydland, Prescott [1977] and
related papers on the choice between policy strategies. The
benefit occurs, in this simple model, because the government
has an incentive to create positive price surprises once the
decisions of the private sector are set. This follows from
the postulated utility function which, since it is oriented
at the short run, seems to reflect the "real world". How-
ever, the outcome of this game between government and the
private sector is suboptimal since agents will take the
incentives for governments into account and adjust their
decisions accordingly. This model can therefore explain the
tendency of secular inflation.
(2) For a discussion of a monetary order with competing monies
see Huss, Trapp [1982].- 24 -
In order to limit the discretionary power and thus contribute to
a stable growth of the economy, parliaments in industrial coun-
tries should pass a law for a monetary order. The details may be
different from one country to another; but a few principles are
essential:
1. The central bank is committed to a stable price level in the
medium run. To achieve this, it should follow a monetary
policy oriented at the production potential of the economy.
2. The central bank announces a target growth for the monetary
base for several (e.g., five) years.
3. The rate of expansion depends on the trend growth of poten-
tial output and the trend of velocity. Estimates are provi-
ded by a group of independent experts.
4. The announced rate can be. changed after one year under the
condition that the experts change their estimates and sub-
stantiate this change.
5. The Governor of the central bank is responsible for the
achievement of the target.
As far as the discussion about the European Central Bank is con-
cerned, it is obvious that there are major differences among
countries about how independent the bank should be. In addition,
there is a dispute about the objectives it should pursue. There-
fore, it would be dangerous to transfer the competences of the
national central bank to a European Central Bank now without a
precise definition of its status and tasks.
An alternative way would be to establish an independent European
Central Bank in addition to the already existing national central
banks. It should supply a European currency which is allowed to
be used without limitation in all countries as legal tender and
which should have a freely flexible exchange rate. Each country
would still have the souvereignty over the national monetary
policy, but must compete with the new currency. As a consequence,
the process toward a currency union would set in automatically if- 25 -
the European currency turns out to be a good store of value. The
European Central Bank would then not be created by a discretio-
nary (or arbitrary) political act but would result from a natural
process in a competitive order.- 26 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
BAKER, James A., Statement. IMF-IBRD Board of Governors, Annual Mee-
tings, Press Release, No. 50, Washington 1987.
BARRO, Robert J., "Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus
Discretion". The Economic Journal, Vol. 95, 1985, Supplement, pp.
23-37.
—, Macroeconomics. 2nd edition, New York 1987.
BERNHOLZ, Peter, "Auf der Suche nach stabilem Geld". Neue Ziircher
Zeitung, December 9, 1987, p. 20.
BLINDER, Alan S., "The Rules-versus-Discretion Debate in the Light of
Recent Experience". Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 123, 1987,
pp. 399-414.
BRUNNER, Karl, "Geldmengenregel als effizientes Ordnungsprinzip".
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, August 17, 1988, p. 11.
CHOURAQUI, Jean-Claude, Michael DRISCOLL, Marc-Olivier STRAUSS-KAHN,
The Effects of Monetary Policy on the Real Sector: An Overview of
Empirical Evidence for Selected OECD Economies. OECD Working Pa-
pers, No. 51, Paris, April 1988.
CROCKETT, Andrew, Strengthening International Economic Cooperation:
The Role of Indicators in Multilateral Surveillance. Washington,
November 1987 (unpublished).
DORNBUSCH, Rudiger, "Doubts about the McKinnon Standard". Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, 1988, No. 1, pp. 105-112.
DUDLER, Hermann-Josef, "Geldmengenpolitik und Finanzinnovationen".
Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 19, 1986, pp. 472-495.
DURAND, Martine, Sveinbjorn BL0NDAL, Are Commodity Prices Leading
Indicators of OECD Prices? OECD Working Papers, No. 49, Paris,
February 1988.
EMERSON, Michael, Regulation or Deregulation of the Labor Market:
Policy Regimes for the Recruitment and Dismissal of Employees in
the Industrialized Countries. Commission of the European Communi-
tites, Economic Paper, No. 55, June 1987.
FISCHER, Bernhard, Ulrich HIEMENZ, Peter TRAPP, Argentina: The Econo-
mic Crisis in the 1980s. Kieler Studien, 197, Tubingen 1985.
FRIEDMAN, Milton, "The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy". Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 69, 1961, pp. 447-466.
—,"The Role of Monetary Policy". The American Economic Review, Vol.
58, 1968, pp. 1-17.- 27 -
—, "The Optimum Quantity of Money". In: Milton Friedman, The Optimum
Quantity of Money and Other Essays. Chicago 1969, pp. 1-50.
—, "Nobel Lecture: Unemployment and Inflation". Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 85, 1977, pp. 451-472.
GREENSPAN, Alan, "Monetary Policy Objectives, Testimony". Reprinted
in: DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, - Ausziige aus Presseartikeln, No. 54,
Frankfurt/M, July 16, 1988, pp. 10-14.
HUSS, Hans-Joachim, Peter TRAPP, "Vorstellungen uber eine alternative
Geldordnung". Kredit und Kapital, Supplement, 1982, No. 7, pp.
79-94.
KYDLAND, Finn E., Edward C. PRESCOTT, "Rules Rather than Discretion:
The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans". Journal of Political Econo-
my, Vol. 85, 1977, pp. 473-491.
LAWSON, Nigel, Statement. IMF-IBRD Board of Governors. Annual Mee-
tings, Press Release, No. 44, Washington 1987.
LUCAS, Robert E., "Principles of Fiscal and Monetary Policy". Journal
of Monetary Economics. Vol. 17, 1986, pp. 117-134.
McCALLUM, Bennett T., "The Case for Rules in the Conduct of Monetary
Policy: A Concrete Example". Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol.
123, 1987, pp. 415-429.
McKINNON, Ronald, "Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies for Interna-
tional Financial Stability". Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 2, 1988, No. 1, pp. 83-103.
MELTZER, Allan H., "Limits of Short-Run Stabilization Policy". Econo-
mic Inquiry, Vol. 25, 1987, pp. 1-14.
SALIN, Pascal, "Comment on the Rules-versus-Discretion Debate". In:
Herbert Giersch (Ed.), Macro and Micro Policies for More Growth
and Employment. Symposium 1987. Tubingen 1988, pp. 71-84.
SCHATZ, Klaus-Werner, Joachim SCHEIDE, Peter TRAPP, Low Growth and
High Unemployment in Europe - Causes and Policy Options. Kiel
Discussion Papers, 140, June 1988.
SCHEIDE, Joachim, The Ups and Downs of the Dollar - Consequences of
the Changes in the Monetary Regime? Kiel Working Papers, 284,
March 1987. 1987.
—, A K-Percent Rule for Monetary Policy in West Germany. Kiel Wor-
king Papers, 337, October 1988.
—, Stefan SINN, How Strong Is the Case for International Coordina-
tion? Kiel Working Papers, 306, December 1987.- 28 -
SCHLESINGER, Helmut, Wilfried JAHNKE, "Geldmenge, Preise und Sozial-
produkt: Interdependenzzusammenhange im Lichte Qkonometrischer
Forschungsergebnisse fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland". Jahr~
biicher fiir Nationalokonomie und Statistik, Vol. 203, 1987, pp.
576-590.
SHAW, George Bernard, The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and
Capitalism. New York 1928.
SOLTWEDEL, Riidiger, Peter TRAPP, "Labor Market Barriers to More Employ-
ment: Causes for an Increase of the Natural Rate. The Case of
West Germany". In: Herbert Giersch (Ed.), Macro and Micro Poli-
cies for More Growth and Employment, Symposium 1987. Tubingen
1988, pp. 181-225.
WEIZSXCKER, Carl Christian von, "Plankoordination mittels eines
BIP-Zieles". Neue Ziircher Zeitung, August 24, 1988, p. 13.